In light of this British offer I wish to draw your attention to the declaration by Admiral Stark on November 3, 1941 at a meeting of the American Joint Board of Staff. “In the case of a Japanese attack against British or Dutch possessions, the United States should resist the attack”. Was the Admiral not acting outside physical constraints within the ADB policies? If so, was he reprimanded for offering this pledge, or made to withdraw it? Is this also not a sign that the comments by Admiral Harwood had the desired effect? If so, is it feasible to consider that the true reason why the ships sailed to their destinies was to reconcile our defence strategies with the US. Does this explanation offer a more realistic assumption of their deployment than those offered by many present day Academics, which are they were sent by Churchill, to both allay Australia’s worries concerning the ever-growing threat to their country from Japan? And also to strike fear into the hearts of the Japanese Military by having two powerful warships acting as a fleeting menace to their shipping?

 

Further assurances of our alleged revised Far Eastern strategy were offered to America with Churchill’s speech at the Lord Mayors Inaugural Luncheon on November 10, 1941, that “we were sending a powerful fleet to the Indian Ocean to safeguard our interests in the region”. The choice of ships was solely down to our Premier, as the Admiralty were of the opinion that the fleet would eventually comprise of, 6 Battleships and 2 Aircraft Carriers. However, Churchill issued a stern refusal to their plans, when informing Dudley Pound. ”This major fleet movement has not yet been approved by me or the Defence Committee” It never was . Why was he so hesitant in deploying a fleet approaching the minimum requirements estimated by earlier Chiefs of Staff reports, if  (as he claimed), the safety of Singapore was always paramount in his thoughts? In contrast, a matter of weeks later and by his express orders Repulse and Prince of Wales reached Singapore to be faced with the task of defending the indefensible. Two ships sent to a colony, which quite possibly may have to face the entire might of the Japanese navy in the coming months, was nothing less than an act of suicide .

 

I feel a person best qualified to give opinions on the deterrent effect of this totally unbalanced fleet is the man who received the Automedon papers 12-months previously namely, Vice Admiral Kondo. He did in fact do this when interviewed by Professor Arthur Marder, in 1976 offering the following observations. “They ‘Japanese Navy’ were not concerned by the size of fleet stationed at Singapore on December 2 1941 (with reference to Repulse and Prince of Wales). However if the fleet grew in size that would be another matter” . He was not alone on these thoughts as the future leader of Force Z Admiral Philips, was of the opinion that the fleet made available by the Admiralty in October 41, was more in keeping with the needs of the colony.

It is recorded that Churchill rode roughshod over every objection to his plans, single-mindedly demanding the ships sailed to Singapore. Could it be he had absolutely no-intentions of attempting a defence of the colony; rather the deployment of this small force could serve two purposes. Firstly to put Anglo-American relations back on an even keel, though more importantly if the Japanese attacked our warships, could this fulfil his burning ambition of direct American involvement?

 

To fully understand the previous statement, certain issues have to be considered; these are as follows.

 

Japans acquired knowledge of Britain’s acceptance to relinquish her hold on Singapore to avoid outright conflict, with their nation, documented in the August 1940 COS report. Admittedly, they also realised that any attack on the colony could bring America into the war. But the captured report must surely have enabled them to realise they only had to nullify one real threat in the Far East and Pacific in connection with their expansionist policies; this being America.

 

Churchill and the War Cabinet’s undoubted awareness that from, as early as November 14, 1940 (Australian Secret Service decrypt, covering distress call from Automedon) there was a distinct possibility that the COS report had fallen into Axis hands. This is further reinforced by the fact that on January 1, 1941, the latest merchant shipping codes (a copy of which was onboard Automedon) were changed. The sole reason for this was that many merchant sailors, whose ships had succumbed to German raiders during the period mid-November – late December 1940 had been informing relevant authorities that the Germans had read their latest signal codes, prior to sinking them, . If the leaders of our country accepted that the shipping codes had been captured from Automedon, as Professor Ian Nish stated in a London School of Economics Debate in 1986. Surely it is ludicrous to attach any credibility to his other claim that “She (Britain) was not aware that the vital document had been captured”.  In this type of situation would it not be necessary to assume the worst scenario? This being the Chiefs of Staff report had also fallen into enemy hands?  

 The alleged pact formed between Roosevelt and Churchill (further details below) of mutual aggression against Japan, should she attack Sovereign territories. It has to be remembered that America was never aware that the COS report had been captured; although representatives from that country were offered copies of it during a visit to Britain in late summer 1940. Would knowledge of this disastrous incident have made them less willing to establish the ADB agreement?

.

The promise of direct American involvement so-craved for by Churchill, I feel originated from the aforementioned ADB meetings. However, Rear Admiral Layton USN states more definite assurances emanate from the meeting between our Premier and Roosevelt, onboard the Prince of Wales at Platencia Bay Newfoundland in August 1941  commonly known as the Atlantic Charter Agreement. His opinions are that Roosevelt exceeded his executive powers by giving assurances to the effect of; if Japan attacked any British colonies, America would immediately intervene and declare war on them. This claim is certainly reinforced, by the fact that in 1945 there was a Congressional hearing on the undemocratic assurances offered by Roosevelt to Churchill of his countries immediate entry into conflict if Sovereign territory was invaded . The hearing concluded that although there were many serious implications clearly apparent, insufficient evidence was presented to warrant further investigation. Apparently, the main reason for this lack of evidence was that several high-ranking American officers present at Platencia Bay refused to offer information to the Board of Inquiry.     

 

In addition, Admiral Layton in his book entitled ‘And I Was There’ maintained, from as early as February 1941, Churchill was attempting to drag America into the war. On that occasion it was in his ‘Drifting Straws’ message to Roosevelt . Which implied that the Japanese were about to attack Australia. However, I can find no such evidence in any written documentation covering that period, substantiating his alleged fears. Furthermore, Churchill appeared, at that point in time, to be extremely concerned over the safety of Australia. This is surely in stark contrast to the fact that he never informed them or any other colonial allies as to the loss of the secret documents. Is it correct to state that the loss of the Far Eastern Appreciation could have had catastrophic consequences for both Australia and New Zealand, if the Japanese had turned their attentions to these unguarded territories?  

Furthermore, the following statement made by Churchill on April 28, 1941, particularly in light of ‘Drifting Straws’ could be seen as a clear contradiction; one that must warrant much explanation. “There is no need at the present time to make any further dispositions for the defence of Malaya and Singapore, beyond those modest arrangements which are in progress until or unless the conditions set out (above) are modified”  In difference to this comment the Australian Military Intelligence, Far Eastern weekly report of w/e April 29, 1941 sent to them by the listening station at Singapore, states “ Japan: Internal political situation likely to be unstable for next few weeks. Soviet-Japanese pact will encourage protagonists of Southward expansion.   

 

Perhaps the greatest mystery of all concerns events of December 5 1941, if Churchill is only guilty of underestimating the Japanese threat, why was so hesitant in implementing “Operation Matador”. How can it be reasonable to accept that he was worried over the implications of invading Thailand with this pre-emptive move, whilst at same time attaching any credence to his claim that he was not unduly worried by the might of Japan? Is it reasonable to assume that our country would not have concerned themselves with any protestations from Thailand if we had ventured to the Isthmus of Kra? If this point is accepted or at the very least noted why did he waste valuable time at a crucial point in the build up to conflict with Japan solely to gain permission from Roosevelt before taking action to prevent the invasion of Malaya? Do you feel America would have sought a similar assurance from our country before defending their territories? Even though Churchill had already offered such a pledge, should they be attacked, the Americans never requested it. In light of this factual information, does Churchill’s later claim of underestimating the Japanese still appear feasible?    

 

With regards to the contents of the captured COS report; it stated we would not attempt to hold Hong Kong because the Japanese foothold in China, made the colony indefensible. Why then, did Churchill allow on September 19 1941, the despatching of two Battalions of Canadian troops to the soon to be toppled outpost? It is on record that he reassured the Canadian Governments fears of the indefensibility of Hong Kong by stating that the colony was no-longer to be treated as a dispensable outpost. Brooke Popham (C in C Far East), on hearing of the Canadians deployment, wrote to the Chiefs of Staff asking had there been a reversal in our policy with regards to Hong Kong. They replied; “there had not, the colony was still to be regarded as an outpost”. The end result of this was that in late December 1941, Japanese forces easily overpowered the untrained Canadian detachments. Those not killed, suffered years of deprivation from their captors; many never returned to their homeland.  

 

Returning to the fate of the warships given the unenviable task of defending Singapore. Whilst Repulse was docked in Durban, (enroute to rendezvousing with the Prince of Wales) the Premier of South Africa, Field Marshall Smutts, addressed the crew. His speech was a profound evaluation of future events, when stating in so many words, the following prediction. ‘As l look out across this fine warship and its young crew I have to say that many of you will not return from this mission” . It was a prophecy all men from the battlecruiser have never forgotten. He also sent a message to Churchill after his meeting with the leader of the battlegroup Admiral Tom Philips some 2 weeks later in Pretoria. This stated “If the Japanese are really nippy, I can see a recipe for a great disaster” . It is a fact that Churchill took no-action whatsoever with regards to this mans worries for the safety of the two warships.

 

On November 28 1941, their fate and eventually that of Singapore were sealed; Admiral Yamamoto was informed the warships were steaming for the colony. He reacted by sending several squadrons of modern bombers to airfields in Indo China; they were to prepare to attack the ships . On December 10 1941, these planes made history; being the first warplanes to sink Capital ships whilst they had the freedom of the ocean to manoeuvre in. It was also to be the greatest naval loss Britain sustained throughout the entire Second World War (the loss of two Capital ships in one action) and was the death knell of battleships. Shortly after that fateful day the mantle of Capital Ship would pass to the aircraft carrier and for the remainder of WW11, these immense men ‘o’ war would (except for a few exceptions) play a supporting role to the carrier.

 

    

 

Notes.

 

9-   Minute from ADB Meeting – Ref FO 371/27775. Also Hart Papers – April 12, 1941.

10- ADM 116/4877 – Prem 3/163/2.

11- Minute by Harwood: Oct 29, 1941. ADM 116/4877.

12- NA/RG – 225.

13- Roskill-Churchill And The Admirals. P-198.

14- Prem 3/156/1.

15- Old Friends-New Enemies: Professor Arthur Marder.

16- Attached notes from Price of Admiralty Vol 11 &111. Professor JWM Chapman.

17-At the time, Britain was aware that Germany was constantly pressurising her Tripartite ally to enter into conflict in the Far East. Furthermore, the reports conclusions made allowance for Japanese infiltration into Southern Indo-China which would result in no-actions being taken by our country to nullify the obvious threat to Singapore and Malaya. From the beginning of 1941, Japan began moving large detachments of men and munitions into this area. We were fully aware of this (Australian Archives: MP1049/5 2021/5//552), and it was an extremely bold move on the part of the Japanese. Could the reason for their apparent lack of concern, regarding reprisals from our country to their territorial gains, be that they had all the necessary assurances in the captured COS report? In addition, the Australian decrypts (mentioned earlier) leave no-doubts that our cryptographers would have been fully aware of Japanese troop movements in Indo-China? Is it feasible to assume that once informed, the War Cabinet and Churchill, would have interpreted these actions, as a strong indication that Japan was in possession of the report and need not worry over our intervention in their expansionist moves?

 

18- Rear Admiral Layton US Navy, was an expert on the Japanese language and served in radio communications during WW11. Until his dying days he seethed with rage at the cover-ups orchestrated by his Government in connection with the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. He also fully understood the severity of the loss of the COS report.

19- Pearl Harbor Hearings (PHH) 10/5083 – 10/4802.

20- Kimball WSC/FDR. C-60X.

 

21- In contrast to Churchill’s ‘Drifting Straws’ warning to Roosevelt of February 1941; our Premier offered the following written observation to the British Chiefs of Staff on January 13, 1941. With reference to their plans to reinforce the colony. “I do not remember to have given my approval to these very large diversions of forces. On the contrary, if my minutes are collected they will be seen to have an opposite tendency. The political situation in the Far East does not seem to require, and the strength of the Air Force by no means permits, the maintenance of such large forces”. If he did not feel the need to reinforce the island, why in February 1941, did he allow elements of the  Australian 8th Division to land at Singapore, under command of Major General Gordon Bennett? Particularly, if he had intelligence reports that their country was about to be invaded? Is it safe to assume that he never informed Australia of his Drifting Straws worries? Perhaps Australia was never really under threat and this was just another ploy to push America closer to conflict?

 

22- W/O 1062620-April 28, 1941.

23- MP 1049/5 – 2021/5/552. Australian Archives.

24- Someone Had Blundered – The loss of Repulse and the Prince of Wales. Bernard Ash.

25- Smutts to Churchill. November 18, 1941.

26- Interview conducted by author with Haruki Iki of ‘Kanoya Air Corps’ who attacked and sunk Repulse and Prince of Wales - May 1997.

  

 

Those Who Paid The Price.

 

If Churchill’s initial plan was to lure America into conflict by using Singapore and Malaya as tempting bait for Japan; callous as it may seem, his actions, at that desperate period in history would have greatly increased Britain’s chances of survival. Because without direct America military involvement, there can be no question that as an island race we would have ceased to exist. However, the real tragedy of this debacle, and one that is often overlooked is that it was only after December 7, 1941 that he began to actively reinforce the colony. When considering the aforementioned point, along with the terrible fate awaiting the vast majority of service personnel soon to be captured in Singapore, and in view of my evidence on the lead up to conflict (of which Churchill was fully aware at the time). Is it not necessary to re-evaluate the reasons why so many troops were sent to certain disaster? I am aware of the general consensus of opinion in the Academic world on this issue, this being, Churchill underestimated the Japanese, however, as I have produced documented and also conflicting evidence to our Premier’s claim. I therefore wish to offer an alternative reason as to why a disaster that at most should have resulted in the loss of a colony and perhaps the capturing of possibly 30-40,000 servicemen turned into the most horrific bloodbath in the 20th Century history of our country.

 

Is it not feasible to assume that for Churchill to be seen as only guilty of underestimating the Japanese threat he would, (post-Dec7), have to rapidly deploy large forces to the colony in a much-publicised attempt to stop the Japanese advance? Would this not have been a way of admitting that although his original estimations were misjudged, he had realised his error and was now acting resolutely in defence of a colony, which for so-long, had been denuded of much needed reinforcements? Would this also not protect him from the full wrath of both the British public and our colonial Governments, with regards to his earlier boasts and assurances of the invulnerability of Singapore? And once the colony finally succumbed, could the only charge levied against him be that he misjudged the Japanese threat? Did this not in fact happen? (26

 

It is also incorrect to state that he kept knowledge of Singapore’s dire predicament, solely for the ears of close members of his cabinet. One only has to read the following message, dated December 7, 1940 (some 4-weeks after the loss of the COS report); the contents of which show that even before America entered the war, Roosevelt was better served with information on this issue that our colonial allies.

 

“It seems clear that Japan is thrusting southward through Indo-China to Saigon and other naval and air bases, thus bringing them within a comparatively short distance of Singapore and the Dutch East Indies… We have today no forces in the Far East capable of dealing with the situation should it develop” .

 

Subsequently, after the attack on Pearl Harbor, our colonies could not fall back on American support; they faced the might of Japan, unaided and alone. Therefore the dye was cast, he must have known it was only a matter of time before we suffered our greatest ever defeat. However, once again, documented evidence can possibly cast doubt on his sincerity regarding the fate of Singapore. This time it concerns his alleged alarm on reading a telegram from General Wavell in early 42, that “Singapore was so badly defended; surrender was inevitable” .

 

In addition, after the loss of Repulse and Prince of Wales no further Capital ships were despatched to safeguard the colony. How can you defend an island base without a naval deterrent? We also had pitifully few warplanes in Malaya and Singapore, and those stationed there, were obsolete. To quote figures, the COS report of August 1940, estimated having 330 first-line aircraft in situ on mainland Malaya by mid-1941; in reality the airforce could only muster approximately 158, mainly obsolete planes, (I have included a full breakdown of their dispositions and models in the appendix).

 

He knew all these facts, so why express surprise at Wavell’s warning? Could it be this course of action enabled him to exonerate himself from the coming storm? In support of this statement, he also commented on numerous occasions, during the fighting for Singapore, as to being totally disgusted with the manner in which all persons trapped on the fortress were fighting in its defence, by conceding ground to the Japanese in every battle that took place. It also appears that the number of Japanese troops involved in the battle was incorrectly stated. Official figures of the time quote 130,000 allied troops succumbed to a mere 30,000 Japanese; this figure nowadays is shown to be far from the truth. In reality, the opposing sides were very closely matched; numerically that is. As it has to be remembered the vast majority of our troops had the most basic of training and were ill-prepared for tropical warfare. They clashed with a battle hardened enemy that had fought for several years beforehand on Mainland China, who also had the benefit of tanks and most importantly full and unhindered air support.

 

With respect to these previous comments; one message issued by Churchill in February 1942, to the troops of the 18th Division perhaps verges on the unbelievable. “There must at this stage be no thought of saving the troops or sparing the population. The battle must be fought to the bitter end at all costs. The 18th Division has a chance to make its name in history. Commanders and senior officers should die with their troops. The honour of the British Empire and of the British Army is at stake” .

 

Also worthy of note is that on December 8 (Singapore time) the island was bombed, shortly before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The reaction from Churchill and his cabinet was one of total apathy towards the future deployment of the warships. In fact, the ships (now known as Force ‘Z’) left Singapore on the orders of Admiral Philips who felt they had to show willing and seek out our new enemy, as the War Cabinet could not reach a decision over what purpose the fleet should fulfil. After the disastrous loss of the ships, Churchill stated that  “the actions of Admiral Philips were not ones, which l would have approved of’”. Adding, the warships (which he insisted on sending to defend the beleaguered colony) should have sailed from Singapore and hidden amongst the vast Eastern Archipelago.

 

If that was his plan, why demand the ships went there in the first instance? If at the first signs of trouble, they where to sail from the colony and hide in the islands? He knew what was needed to realistically defend the colony and that we could never provide such military might, because of other commitments closer to home. Furthermore, was Admiral Philips informed of this contingency plan before leaving Britain, or Churchill’s other idea, that the ships should sail to Pearl Harbor and join the decimated American Fleet? Can these undisclosed alternatives be seen as a ‘get out’ for him and the War Cabinet, leaving Philips to carry the full responsibility for the loss of Repulse and Prince of Wales (which in fact did happen)? In conclusion, if Force ‘Z’ had taken one of these alternative courses of action; surely they would have been seen to be deserting the colony? In addition, does this mean a force of warships sailed to defend a colony with no preordained defence strategy? .

 

Churchill was always admired by the British public for his apparent ‘Bull Dog’ spirit; in contrast to his popular media display of tenacity. One letter written to his wife whilst enroute to America, onboard the battleship Duke of York, to attend a meeting of his calling with President Roosevelt, (he sailed 3 days after the devastating loss of the Repulse and Prince of Wales). Can possibly be construed as showing an unusually pessimistic outlook from him with reference to the battle for Malaya and Singapore, which had yet to reach its climax. I quote directly from page 19 of  ‘The Road to Victory’ by Martin Gilbert; “We must expect to suffer heavily in this war with Japan, and it is no use the critics saying ‘Why were we not prepared’ when everything we had was already fully engaged. The entry of United States into the war is worth all the losses sustained in the East many times over. Still these losses are very hard to repair”. With this in mind could it be that the active reinforcing of Singapore and Malaya (post Dec 8, 1941) was a political gesture, designed to appease the Americans, whilst they fought for their existence in the Philippines?

          

Over the years, I have viewed countless documentaries and read many Government documents covering the war in the Far East. Not one has ever mentioned the significance of the cargo captured by the Germans on the Automedon. They have (without exception) stated, Churchill made a blunder over the loss of Repulse and Prince of Wales, and that Singapore was a disaster borne from colonial complacency. There is a certain element of truth in the latter statement, however as for the loss of the warships and the vast majority of deaths on the colony, the blame for this must surely fall squarely on the shoulders of Churchill.

 

 

Could it therefore be said, it wasn’t a series of blunders; rather the root cause of this disaster was of his making in a bold plan that basically backfired. And also that the horrendous loss of life incurred could, to a considerable degree, have been averted, if he had so-wished. Would it then be possible to state that after December 7, 1941 his only concern appeared to have been in portioning blame for the debacle of Singapore with every person who fought on the island. In conclusion to this statement, compare my version of events regarding our crushing defeat in Singapore and Malaya, with the relevant chapters in his memoirs. I guarantee he makes no-mention of the captured COS report, or his foreknowledge of Singapore’s indefensibility.

 

In contrast, many historians feel Churchill did in fact assume we could hold Singapore. In reply to their opinions, I have to say that documented and damning evidence emanating from the period 1940-41, is openly available, which steadfastly refutes their claims. Furthermore he must have agreed with the Chiefs of Staff and their pessimistic report (COS 40-592 Revise), otherwise why allow a copy to be sent to Singapore? If by 1941, he felt we could now implement a strong and vigorous defence of the colony, what had changed in other theatres of conflict for this sudden wave of optimism? One example of increasing anxiety was merchant shipping losses in the Atlantic (due to the marauding ‘U’ Boats) were mounting by the month. In addition, if he felt we could hold the colony why, for almost 12-months beforehand, ask for American assistance in this area, when at the same time, refuse to strengthen our own forces in Malaya and Singapore? I put it to you that in light of this evidence the excuse of underestimating the Japanese threat does not ring true.   

 

If, however my theory of the de-facto pact is taken into consideration matters are shown in a different light. Particularly when considering a ‘Most Secret’ directive issued by Churchill on April 28, 1941 . In which he implies that “Japan was unlikely to come into the war unless Germany invades Britain, and even a major disaster like the loss of the Middle East would possibly not make her come in”. Most importantly adding “Finally it may be taken as almost certain that the entry of Japan into the war would be followed by the immediate entry of United States on our side”

 

In addition, he was fully aware of America’s worries over Japan’s expansionist moves in the Far East, he also knew they were closely monitoring the situation. Is it not feasible to assume that Roosevelt would view any Japanese territorial gains as a direct threat to his own countries possessions in the Pacific? Furthermore, it is known that Churchill played to America’s fears over the aforementioned threat. Can it be considered that this is the main reason why Roosevelt may have pledged the joint aggression pact against Japan?  

 

Peter Elphick in his work “Singapore The Pregnable Fortress” implies that the same ‘Most Secret’ directive can be seen as a clear indication that Churchill underestimated the Japanese threat. Could it be that the threat was never underestimated, to the contrary, it was exploited. Is it reasonable to assume it would be in our country’s interest to tempt Japan into attacking Singapore? If they took the bait and invaded our territories, would this not have the desired effect of bringing America into the war? Admittedly, Pearl Harbor would have changed matters dramatically, by scuppering Churchill’s original plan. Although is it worthy of consideration that all that was then required to cover his previous duplicity would be to continue with an outwardly confident attitude regarding the safety of Singapore to his fellow countrymen and colonial allies? And continue reinforcing the island almost to the bitter end? Did this in fact not happen when two troopships destined for the Middle East were diverted to Singapore? Did they not land a matter of weeks before the surrender?

 

One statement issued by Churchill on January 21, 1942 possibly helps to substantiate my theory on the reasons why he continued to reinforce the colony. The following sentence possibly indicates that at the time he considered abandoning Singapore. “If it is only for a few weeks (referring to the defence of Singapore) it is certainly not worth losing all our reinforcements and aircraft” .

 

A copy of this minute was inadvertently shown to Australia’s representative on the War Cabinet, Earl Page. Incensed by the implications, he contacted his Premier, John Curtin, who on January 24, telegraphed Churchill, stating: “the evacuation of Malaya and Singapore would be regarded here and elsewhere as an inexcusable betrayal” .

On January 26, Churchill assured Earl Page that the decision of the Defence Committee on January 21 had been “that the battle of Johore and the defence of Singapore Island should be given the highest priority”. Pointing to Wavell’s instructions that “the battle should be fought out, if need be, in the ruins of Singapore”. Perhaps it can be said that to save this duplicity from being uncovered, the slaughter was to continue.

 

As from the period, 3-1-1942 till 5-2-1942, a total of 45 troop ships arrived in Singapore, some men would never fire a shot in anger, and in reality they travelled halfway across the world to surrender .

 

Finishing my synopsis with Japans entry into the war; I am in full agreement with the opinions of Professor John Chapman in the acknowledgements to his work ‘The Price of Admiralty’ concerning the significance of the captured documents on Automedon: I quote directly.

 

Perhaps the most important evidence of German influence over the Combined Fleet can be demonstrated in the handing over in December 1940 of top-level British Cabinet papers captured off Singapore by the raider ‘Atlantis’. This fact enabled the Japanese Combined Fleets to concentrate single-mindedly on the attack on Pearl Harbor in the certain knowledge that Britain could not provide strong enough forces to compel the Japanese to divide the Combined Fleet more evenly between the Anglo-American Fleets. It also accounts for one of the reasons for the British authorities, who had the original War Diary (Wenneker’s) in their possession since 1945, being reluctant to reveal fuller details of the incident and its background. This knowledge is quite indispensable for an understanding of the reasons why the European War was transformed into a global conflict”.

 

In conclusion, can it be said, that the capture of one solitary report on a British merchant ship in November 1940, was the catalyst for three and a half years of bitter conflict, culminating in the nuclear age

 

 

Notes.

 

26- That Roosevelt did provide Churchill with what amounted to a potentially unconstitutional assurance of alliance became public knowledge six months later. To the consternation of presidential aide Harry Hopkins, on 17 January 1942, the prime minister felt obliged to allude to the agreement in defending himself against a censure motion in the House of Commons. To the charge that Britain ’s colonies in the Far East had been inadequately guarded, Churchill asserted he had taken care that Britain “should not be exposed single-handed to the Japanese onslaught”. Choosing his words with caution lest he let the cat out of the bag and embarrass the president, he insisted there had been no neglect because of “the probability since the Atlantic conference at which I discussed these matters with President Roosevelt, that the United States, even if not attacked herself, would come into a war in the Far East” His “expectation”- as he put it was -“reinforced as time went on” and “one had greater assurance that if Japan ran amok in the Pacific we should not fight alone”. Nor, as Churchill told his detractors had his confidence in the United States been “falsified by events”. From page 135 of “And I Was There”: (Prime Ministers quotes derived from Hansard 27 January 1941).

 

27- Churchill: Their Finest Hour – P562.

28- Churchill Papers. 20/67.

29- A copy of this message is on display at the Cabinet War Rooms London.

30- In the publication by the late Professor Arthur Marder, ‘Old Friends-New Enemies’ a detailed account is given on the meeting between Admiral Philips and other relevant officials stationed on Singapore, including Captain’s, Tennant of Repulse and Leech of Prince of Wales, in the early hours of Dec  8 1941. During discussions of the options available to Force Z, no mention is made of Churchill’s later claims that he felt the fleet should leave Singapore at the first signs of Japanese aggression. In contrast, one Admiralty signal (1229Z/7) pours scorn on the War Cabinets and Churchill’s possible face-saving attempts at distancing themselves from the disaster. Surely this signal can only be interpreted as an invitation for Admiral Philips to seek conflict with the rapidly invading Japanese, (he received it on the evening of Dec 7, Singapore time)? It reads:

 

“No decision has yet been taken by HM Government, but on the assumption that it may be decided that if a Japanese expedition is located in the South China Sea in such a position that its course indicates that it is proceeding towards Thailand, Malaya, Borneo or Netherlands East Indies, report what action would be possible to take with Naval or Air Forces. In addition on December 2 1941, the day Repulse and Prince of Wales arrived at Singapore, intelligence reports stated “Aircraft, French Indo-China, North 120, South-180 (including 90 heavy Bombers). Majority of second fleet comprising of 12 modern cruisers, 28 destroyers, now in Formosa-South China area, 9 submarines sighted 100 miles North of Camranh Bay 2nd December, course South. (Australian Archives: 2021/5/552). It is not known if Admiral Philips was made aware of this daunting force gathering before him. Further messages, in particular COS (41) 44th Mtg.  (0), CAB 79/55, (PREM 3/158/6 and Principal War Telegram Pt. i. 5) cast very strong doubts on both the War Cabinet and Churchill’s post disaster statements with regards to their apparent disapproval of Admiral Philips future actions with Force Z.

31- WO 106/2620.

32- PM’s personal minutes. D62-Churchill Papers 20/67.

33- Mr Curtin to PM. Jochu No 21- Jan 24, 1942. Churchill Papers 20/69.

34- Reinforcement Convoys Singapore – ADM 199/1185.

 

Final Word.

“No Americans will think it wrong of me if I proclaim that to have the United States on our side was to be the greatest joy…England would live; Britain would live; the Commonwealth of Nations and the Empire would live. How long the war would last or in what fashion it would end no-man could tell, nor did I at this moment care. Once again in our long island history we would emerge… safe and victorious. We should not be wiped out…Being saturated and satiated with emotion and sensation, I went to bed and slept the sleep of the saved and thankful”. (Winston Churchill – The Second World War, vol 3,page 539).

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

PRIOR KNOWLEDGE

One of the most important elements in America's foreknowledge of Japan's intentions was our government's success in cracking Japan's secret diplomatic code known as "Purple." Tokyo used it to communicate to its embassies and consulates, including those in Washington and Hawaii. The code was so complex that it was required to be enciphered and deciphered by machine. A talented group of American cryptoanalysts broke the code in 1940 and devised a facsimile of the Japanese machine. These, utilized by the intelligence sections of both the War and Navy departments, swiftly revealed Japan's diplomatic messages. The deciphered texts were nicknamed "Magic."

 December 1st-2nd:1941 The Japanese embassies in non-Axis nations around the world were directed to dispose of their secret documents and all but one copy of their codes. An additional warning had come via the so-called "winds" message. A November 18th intercept indicated that, if a break in U.S. relations were forthcoming, Tokyo would issue a special radio warning. This would not be in the Purple code, as it was intended to reach consulates and lesser agencies of Japan not equipped with the code or one of its machines. The message, to be repeated three times during a weather report, was "Higashi no kaze ame," meaning "East wind, rain." "East wind" signified the United States; "rain" signified diplomatic split - in effect, war.

This prospective message was deemed so significant that U.S. radio monitors were constantly watching for it, and the Navy Department typed it up on special reminder cards. On December 4th, "Higashi no kaze ame" was indeed broadcast and picked up by Washington intelligence.

It was long presumed that as the Japanese fleet approached Pearl Harbor, it maintained complete radio silence. This is untrue. The fleet barely observed discretion, let alone silence. Naval intelligence intercepted and translated numerous dispatches, some clearly revealing that Pearl Harbor had been targeted. The most significant was the following, sent by Admiral Yamamoto to the Japanese First Air Fleet on November 26, 1941:

"The task force, keeping its movement strictly secret and maintaining close guard against submarines and aircraft, shall advance into Hawaiian waters, and upon the very opening of hostilities shall attack the main force of the United States fleet and deal it a mortal blow. The first air raid is planned for the

 

dawn of x-day. Exact date to be given by later order."

 

A PRELUDE TO WAR SECRET EXPOSED.

 

November 19th 1941 just 28 days before Japans attack on Pearl harbour The Australian war ship HMAS Sydney was operating off Western Australia. when she came across the German raider Kormoran. In the short battle which ensued The Kormoran was sunk and as the Sydney started to limp away, she was hit by one or two torpedos and she sank with the loss of all the crew..

The disappearance of the Sydney caused no immediate alarm, as ships often went missing for several days before reporting, and it was not until the end of December that the ship was officially reported missing presumed sunk.

It was not until the end of the war that enquiries were made concerning this missing ship. The time Sydney went missing, Japan had not entered the war .Ashore the Naval authorities were aware that HMAS Sydney had engaged with a German raider, and it was presumed that both ships had sunk each other, until enquiries revealed that nothing remained of the Sydney. no survivors, no wreckage, no radio messages etc.

Further investigations discovered that 360 of the Kormorans crew had been rescued. those questioned were of the opinion that Sydney had sunk their ship and then retired. One of them remembered that as the warship retired, there was an explosion which lit the sky. Over the following years further enquiries suggested that a Japanese submarine had fired two torpedos into the Sydney , after which the crew of the submarine machine gunned all survivors and destroyed and sunk any wreckage.

As late as 1998 it was established that a Japanese submarine 1-58 had been  illegally operating off Western Australia at the time the Sydney was sunk.

These facts raised many questions which included the following,

It is now a well known fact that the Japanese were lured into the war, in order to bring the Americans with all their wealth and manpower into the war. It was well known that the Japanese would attack Pearl on the 7th December. In fact the Japanese fleet had been shadowed since leaving home waters.

Had the fact that a Japanese submarine had attacked and sunk an allied warship while supposed negotiations between Japan and the west were still being held, it would be considered an immediate declaration of war, which under normal circumstances the British government would have retaliated

However Churchill and Roosevelt had already made preparations for the Japanese to attack an American naval base in order to bring the Americans into the war. They had no wish for anything to divert their plans. So although the British and Australian governments were fully aware that Japanese submarines were operating in the Australian hemisphere, the matter had to remain secret. The British government were in possession of   machinations from which they were able to listen and record every movement of Japanese shipping. Read the book ( “Somewhere Below ISBN 192083131 2 ) .

 

In Java, in early December, the Dutch Army decoded a dispatch from Tokyo to its Bangkok embassy, forecasting attacks on four sites including Hawaii. The Dutch passed the information to Brigadier General Elliot Thorpe, the U.S. military observer. Thorpe sent Washington a total of four warnings. The last went to General Marshall's intelligence chief. Thorpe was ordered to send no further messages concerning the matter. The Dutch also had their Washington military attaché, Colonel Weijerman, personally warn General Marshall.

On November 29th, Secretary of State Cordell Hull secretly met with freelance newspaper writer Joseph Leib. Leib had formerly held several posts in the Roosevelt administration. Hull knew him and felt he was one newsman he could trust. The secretary of state handed him copies of some of the Tokyo intercepts concerning Pearl Harbor. He said the Japanese were planning to strike the base and that FDR planned to let it happen. Hull made Leib pledge to keep his name out of it, but hoped he could blow the story sky-high in the newspapers.

The foregoing represents just a sampling of evidence that Washington knew in advance of the Pearl Harbor attack. For additional evidences, see Infamy: Pearl Harbor and Its Aftermath by Pulitzer Prize-winning historian John Toland, and Day of Deceit: The Truth about FDR and Pearl Harbor by Robert Stinnett.(1) So certain was the data that, at a private press briefing in November 1941, General George Marshall confidently predicted that a Japanese-American war would break out during the "first ten days of December."

To ensure a successful Japanese attack - one that would enrage America into joining the war - it was vital to keep Kimmel and Short out of the intelligence loop. However, Washington did far more than this to facilitate the Japanese assault.

 The Japanese strike sank or heavily damaged 18 naval vessels (including eight battleships), destroyed 188 planes, and left over 2,000 dead. The Roberts Commission, assigned to investigate the attack, consisted of personal cronies of Roosevelt and Marshall. The Commission fully absolved Washington and declared that America was caught off guard James Perloff is the author of The Shadows of Power: The Council on Foreign Relations and the American Decline

 

 

UNSUNG HEROES

by Arthur Lane