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"Chemical Warfare Agent Toxicity for Both Genders from Different Age and Ethnic Groups"

 

A report prepared by the Andrulis Corporation for the D049 Program at US Army Dugway Proving Ground, October 1999. Sponsored by the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA).

 

Introduction
Edward Hammond of the Sunshine Project

>>> The Citizen's Education Project and the Sunshine Project requested this report in August 2004 because its title suggests that the US Army has recently exposed people to chemical weapons (CW) agents. The report does not detail any recent human experiments, although that conclusion can only be tentative, because large portions of the report are blacked-out and parts of the D049 program are classified.

The report began when the Pacific Command noted that US CW toxicity data is based on a 70 kilogram male. Are there differences, the Pacific Command asked, for people who are not 70 kg males? Assuming that the Command was asking for the right reasons (i.e. defensive ones), then the question was reasonable enough.

Once the query got to the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) and Dugway Proving Ground, however, it morphed into a gem of late 20th century military science. Reminiscent of phrenology (racial skull studies) in vogue a hundred years ago, the report will leave critical readers laughing at its quack ethnic distinctions; but also horrified at what is implied by this "science."

Consider, for example, the tactical implications in a chemical conflict if the US Army relies on older data, reported in this paper, that "African-Americans are more resistant than Caucasians to [mustard gas] vapor and liquid." It's a good thing such studies were not completed during the First World War, or we might have witnessed the "Charge of the Black Brigade." The report also cites the 1940s San Jose Project, in which "continental" and Puerto Rican soldiers were compared for their reactions to mustard gas exposure.

Fast forward - in time, if not enlightenment: According to the 1999 DTRA / Dugway report, for the purposes of chemical warfare humanity can be divided into four "general ethnic groups." These, it says, can be defined as follows:

Caucasian (people from the United States, Canada, United Kingdom, Europe, Russia, and Australia), 2) South American, 3) Oriental (people from China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, and Singapore), and 4) other Asian (people from India, Philippines, Thailand, Laos, East Indies, etc.)."

Based on these quack distinctions, the report goes on to draw conclusions about

 

Australia), 2) South American, 3) Oriental (people from China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, and Singapore), and 4) other Asian (people from India, Philippines, Thailand, Laos, East Indies, etc.)."

Based on these quack distinctions, the report goes on to draw conclusions about susceptibility to blister and nerve agents. The lunacy should be self-evident. We don't know what happened to Native Americans or to Africa, among other peoples and places, in DTRA's ethnic scheme. We're not going to hazard a guess.

Conclusions based on ethnic categories include, for example, that the physical characteristics of an average "Oriental" male lessen the amount of CW agent that he must be exposed to in order to produce a casualty, but that, relatively speaking, he can inhale a greater proportion of that agent without being taken out of action - or placed in a body bag.

Apparently referring to "Caucasians," the report concludes that American military men (but not women) are among the world's best at withstanding exposure to nerve and blister agents.

The report concludes by suggesting how to adapt the 70 kg man toxicity data to fit "other Asians," "South Americans," women, etc. The section containing these conclusions was entirely blacked-out. DTRA maintains that the information is export-controlled, meaning that it cannot be shared with non-Americans without potentially endangering US national security

 

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When Col. Thompson arrived in Japan, the International Military Tribunal for the Far East had began the trial of Japanese Class A war criminals. In the meantime, Maj. Gen. Kitano, Commander of Unit 731 from August 1942 to March 1944, was brought back to Japan from China to face interrogation. Though Ishii was declared dead in newspapers and a mock funeral was held in Ishii's home town, he was available for Thompson's interrogation which was to last from January 17 to February 25, 1946. Ishii's tactics of resistance was to speak as little as he could and minimize the magnitude of biological warfare research as much as possible. He admitted neither human experiments nor Emperor Hirohito's involvement Like Sanders before him. For his contribution Ishii was elected to the Japanese senate. Thompson was fooled. He finished his investigation report at the end of May 1946, augmenting knowledge on manufacturing germ bombs and technique of mass production of germs achieved by Unit 73 1. (These included bacteriological  germs similar to the AIDS virus) MacArthur was empowered "to approve, reduce or otherwise alter any sentence imposed by "the International Military 'Tribunal the Far East." Chief Prosecutor Keenan, though deriving his powers from the US government, handed control of the whole International Prosecution Section to MacArthur. Ishii and members of Unit 731 were exonerated from being sued for war crimes in exchange for their human experiment data, a price paid by several thousand lives MacArthur sent the following telegram to the President of the United States. “Ishii states that if guaranteed immunity from "war crimes" in documentary form for himself, superiors and subordinates, he can describe program in detail ... Complete story, to include plans and theories of Ishii and superiors, probably can be obtained by document immunity to Ishii and associates”. The message put the State-War-Navy coordinating Committee at Washington into crucial dilemma. Its sub-committee for the Far East did not complete its report on MacArthur's May 6 recommendation until August 1, and in the report a comparison of Nazi scientists and doctors as war criminals was drawn:

The conclusion the Committee for the Far East reached was: "The value to the U.S. of Japanese Bacteriological Warfare data is of such importance to national security as to far outweigh the value accruing from war crimes' prosecution." In spite of the State Department strongly dissenting as such a course would be a violation of international laws and detrimental to human morality and once revealed, it would be a source of serious embarrassment to the United States, the SWNCC accepted MacArthur's recommendation and decided that "the BW information obtained from Japanese sources should be retained in 'top secret' intelligence channels and not be employed as war crimes evidence" and not be fallen into the Soviet hands. However, the formal reply to MacArthur's recommendation had dragged on until March 13, 1948, when the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent his cable of approval to Tokyo.

From the first investigation in the autumn of 1945, MacArthur acceded to granting immunity to members of Unit 731 in exchange for data of research on biological warfare.

 

He also inculcated on Sanders to keep silence on "human experiments." And the belated reply from the Joint Chiefs to MacArthur's May 6, 1947 recommendation can only be construed on broad background. Viewed against this background, can we understand why the United States tried its utmost to get ahead in the biological warfare. MacArthur had lost his interest in pursuing the issue of war criminals and in making Japan pay war reparations to the victimized nations, particularly China. Just as Fell once said in connection with MacArthur Headquarter's re the secret funding for Unit 731: "The feeling of several staff groups in Washington, including G-2, is that this problem is more or less a 'family' affair in FEC [Far East Command It should be kept in mind that there is a remote-possibility that independent investigation conducted by the Soviets in the Mukden area may have disclosed evidence that American prisoners of war were used for experimental purposes of a BW nature and that they lost their lives as a result of these experiments. Out of 1,485 Allied white prisoners of war taken to Mukden, 1, 174 were Americans. In their first winter (1942-43) at Mukden, 430 perished, most Americans. No matter how desperate American survivors from Mukden, like Gregory Rodriquez of Oklahoma, tried to tell how they were used by Unit 731 for human experiments, an accusation verified by Naoji Uezono, former member of Unit 731, U.S. Congress turned a deaf ear , thereby being irresponsible for paying their medical benefits and compensations. A British Major Robert Peaty kept a diary while detained in Mukden that gives sufficient evidence of Unit 731's using Allied prisoners of war as guinea pigs.. For over ten years, Rodriquez's son has persistently lobbied in Washington on behalf of his father and other survivors from Mukden. Not only does he ask for compensations to the victims; moreover he wants that the crimes of Japan using the prisoners of war for human experiments be known to the world Any fair-minded person would pose the question did the United States unleash a large-scale biological warfare in the Korean war.: just wanting to see what degree of success could be obtained with the essentially Japanese methods.

 

 

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THE FATE OF COLONEL CYRIL WILD

 

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